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1 Buddhist Philosophers and Non-Existence
Buddhist philosophers are critical of the generous ontology advocated by non-
Buddhist Indian philosophers.1 They reject the existence of all sorts of things
which are important for the non-Buddhist. For instance, the Buddhist holds that
the self does not exist. That there is no self is an important Buddhist doctrine.
Whatever this doctrine is supposed to mean, the Buddhist has to argue against
those who are convinced that the self does exist and there are plenty of those who
implicitly or explicitly believe in the self. The problem with Buddhist philoso-
phers in arguing against their opponent is that they agree with non-Buddhists that
one cannot prove a thesis whose subject is non-existent. This agreement has put
Buddhist philosophers in a difficult situation. How can they argue against their
opponents and show that the self and all other things that Buddhists take to be
non-existent do not exist while agreeing that one cannot prove a thesis whose
subject is non-existent?
1This seems to change as Buddhism went East to China (and Korea and Japan). See
Tanaka (forthcoming). In this paper, I am mostly concerned with Buddhist philosophers who
flourished in India and Tibet.
The problem for Buddhist philosophers is not confined to their central doc-
trines. They are actually much worse as they tend to be global error theorists. An
error theorist typically holds that there are no facts of the matter in a specific con-
text. An error theorist about morality holds that there are no moral facts. Some er-
ror theorists further hold that there are no truths about morality. For error theorists
about morality, any moral discourse is, strictly speaking, not true (Joyce (2016)).
Similarly, an error theorist about fictions hold that there are no truths about fic-
tional characters. For them, it is not true that Sherlock Holmes lived in 221B
Baker Street, London. Some error theorists also hold that there are no facts or
truths about fictional characters even within fictions as the properties attributed
to them are not factual matters. According to those error theorists about fictional
characters, it is, strictly speaking, not true that Harry Potter was pretending to be
dead when Voldemort cast the killing curse (Avada Kedavra) with the Elder Wand
even within the Harry Potter books. For them, any claim about fictional characters
is not truth-apt (Brock (2002)).
If we generalise an error theory to any context, we get global error theory. A
global error theorist holds that there are no facts or truths about anything. Many
Buddhist philosophers, at least those in India and Tibet, can be characterised as
global error theorists who held that there are no facts or truths about anything as
there is not anything that really exists. This does not make them nihilists as they do
think that things do have quasi-existence (conventional existence (sam˙vr. tisat)).2
But non-Buddhist philosophers are typically not global error theorists and hold
that a lot of things do really exist. Buddhist philosophers, thus, have to argue
against them about many things which they do not think really exist and about
which there are not really any truths.
Demonstrating that Buddhist philosophers can be described as global error
theorists is beyond the scope of this paper.3 For the sake of this paper, I will
assume that Buddhist philosophers are largely global error theorists. The question
then is: how can they claim that it is true that something which does not exist does
not exist when the opponent holds that it exists?
In this paper, I will first present a difficulty that Buddhist philosophers have
faced in proving that what they take to be non-existent does not exist. I will then
survey two main solutions that they have provided. Those ‘solutions’ may not
solve the problem or solve the problem but creates other problems. I will not
survey the Buddhist treatment of the problem of proving about non-existence in
2What exactly this means is a complicated issue. See, for instance, Cowherds (2011) for a
discussion.
3This is a difficult and controversial task and I do not pretend that describing Buddhist philoso-
phers as largely global error theorists is widely accepted. However, see Tillemans (2016) who
describes some Buddhist philosophers as global error theorists even though he does not use the
phrase ‘global error theory’ or ‘global error theorist’.
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order to present a new solution that we have yet to see. Instead, I will articulate
a problem about non-existence that is unique to Buddhist philosophers. I will do
so in order to present an interesting puzzle about non-existence that has largely
escaped attention in the ‘Western’ literature.
2 A¯s´raya¯siddha
Buddhist discussion of non-existence centres around a¯s´raya¯siddha (unestablished
basis). It is (or was) commonly accepted in India that when the ‘basis’ (a¯s´raya) or
subject (dharmin) of a thesis (paks. a) is unestablished, that is to say, non-existent,
the thesis cannot be established or proved. The fallacious nature of a¯s´raya¯siddha
is commonly accepted by both Buddhist philosophers and their philosophical op-
ponents (i.e., non-Buddhist Indian philosophers). In everyday situation, we may
not be puzzled when someone claims that the pretension of Harry Potter when he
was struck by Voldemort cannot be proved to be real because of his non-existence.
But, about things that matter philosophically such as the reality or unreality of the
self, the threat of the fallacy of a¯s´raya¯siddha is a real issue.
For Buddhist philosophers, a¯s´raya¯siddha becomes particularly problematic as
they are typically global error theorists. The problem is historically acute in two
contexts which are concerned with existence generally: Buddhist ‘proofs’ of mo-
mentariness and Buddhist, particularly (later) Madhyamaka, proofs of the absence
of intrinsic nature (nih. svabha¯vata¯).4 In both contexts, Buddhist philosophers want
to prove a thesis whose basis or subject is non-existent. In the context of mo-
mentariness, Buddhists want to prove that whatever exists is momentary (i.e., if
something exists, it exists only momentarily). If we contrapose it within the uni-
versal quantifier (most, if not all, Buddhist philosophers accept contraposition as
valid), what they want to prove is that whatever is non-momentary is non-existent.
But, for the Buddhists, there cannot be anything which is non-momentary. So the
thesis of momentariness has a subject (or subjects) that is (or are) non-existent.
Hence Buddhist philosophers have to come up with a way around a¯s´raya¯siddha
(Matilal (1970)). In the context of the absence of intrinsic nature (nih. svabha¯vata¯),
if something lacks intrinsic nature, it does not exist for the opponent. Buddhists,
in particular Ma¯dhyamikas, would have to agree to this to a certain degree since,
for them, there are not really any facts about anything and so they cannot claim,
for instance, that the self does not really exist. So the thesis that everything lacks
4Madhyamaka school consists of Buddhist philosophers who are the followers of Na¯ga¯rjuna
(2nd CE) known for his doctrine of emptiness. Following modern convention, I will use ‘Mad-
hyamaka’ to refer to the school or thought and ‘Ma¯dhyamika’ to refer to people who belong to the
school or hold the thought.
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intrinsic nature has a subject (or subjects) that does not (or do not) exist.5
Given the importance of momentariness and the absence of intrinsic nature (or
emptiness (s´u¯nyata¯)), Buddhist philosophers have to take the fallacy of a¯s´raya¯siddha
seriously. Historically, Buddhist philosophers have suggested mainly two solu-
tions to a¯s´raya¯siddha. In the rest of the paper, I will explain what I take those
solutions to be and how they developed in the Buddhist philosophical tradition.
3 Avoiding the Fallacy of A¯s´raya¯siddha Part I
Buddhist discussions on a¯s´raya¯siddha tend to start with the definition of (valid)
thesis (paks. alaks. an. a) that Digna¯ga (480-540 CE) provided in his Prama¯n. asamuccaya:
[A valid] thesis is one which is intended by [the proponent] himself
as something to be stated in its proper form alone; [and] with regard
to [the opponent’s] own subject, it is not opposed by perceptible ob-
jects, by inference, by authority or by what is commonly recognised.
(Prama¯n. asamuccaya III, k. 2)6
Digna¯ga was the main figure, alongside Dharmakı¯rti (7th CE), who laid down
the foundation for the Buddhist study of epistemology and logic, in particular,
the study of the methods for proof and acquisition of knowledge (prama¯n. a). The
particular concern for Digna¯ga was to undermine and disprove the scriptural au-
thority of the Vedas, the authoritative texts which are said to prove a number of
things for non-Buddhist philosophers in India. Digna¯ga argued against the author-
itative words (a¯ptava¯da) as proving anything on their own and argued for only two
means of acquiring knowledge: perception (pratyaks. a) and inference (anuma¯na).
Digna¯ga, Dharmakı¯rti and those Buddhist philosophers who have followed their
lead have generally assumed that what we can know depends on how we can
know it. That is, to use modern epistemological terminology, they are generally
reliabilists.7 They do not think that the cognitive state you happen to arrive at
counts as knowledge. Cognition has to go through particular transformation for
the resulting cognitive state to count as a knowledge state.8
Buddhist philosophers who came after Digna¯ga have generally taken his defi-
nition to mean that the property to be proved ‘with regard to [the proponent’s] own
subject’, i.e., the thesis that the proponent is arguing for, should not be opposed
by any (valid) means of acquiring knowledge. More importantly for our purpose,
5See Kamalas´ı¯la’s (740-795 CE) Madhyamaka¯loka. A translation can be found in Keira (2004).
6This translation is from Tillemans (1999): 172.
7‘Reliabilists’ and ‘reliabilism’ are terms that I am attributing to the Buddhists rather than the
translations of any of the terms they use.
8See, for instance, Patil (2009), Tillemans (1999) and Tanaka (2013).
4
they have also taken the definition to mean that the proponent’s subject as well
as the property to be proved (sa¯dhyadharma) must be existent (Tillemans (1999):
172). Digna¯ga himself did not seem to have implied that the proponent’s subject
must be existent by his definition. However, he did seem to have thought that
a¯s´raya¯siddha is a fallacy and it is to be avoided as he was aware of the difficulty
involved in proving that what he took to be non-existent does not indeed exist.
The issue of a¯s´raya¯siddha comes out distinctly for Digna¯ga in the context
of discussing Primordial Matter (pradha¯na) whose existence the non-Buddhist
Sa¯m. khya philosophers accept but Buddhist philosophers reject. He is concerned
with discussing two different arguments in connection with Primordial Matter of
the Sa¯m. khya school. First, he discusses the Sa¯m. khya arguments that allegedly
show the existence of Primordial Matter. In those arguments, Sa¯m. khya philoso-
phers argue for the existence of Primordial Matter from the general characteristics
that all individual things share in common. Second, he discusses the Buddhist ar-
guments showing the non-existence of Primordial Matter. For the Buddhist, even
talking about these two kinds of arguments invites the charge of a¯s´raya¯siddha
as the subject matter of both kinds of arguments is non-existent. Digna¯ga seems
aware of this and tries to avoid the charge. He offers different solutions in rela-
tion to the two kinds of arguments. Let’s look at how he tries to avoid the fallacy
of a¯s´raya¯siddha in relation to the two kinds of arguments involving Sa¯m. khya’s
Primordial Matter.
In response to the Sa¯m. khya arguments that purportedly show the existence of
Primordial Matter, Digna¯ga says:
[Sa¯m. khya philosophers] should formulate the thesis as ‘The various
individuals certainly possess one and the same cause [i.e., pradha¯na],
in which case they do not prove [directly the existence of] the Primor-
dial Matter.9
He is suggesting here that the Sa¯m. khya thesis that Primordial Matter exists can be
paraphrased in a way that the Buddhist can accept (Tillemans (1999): 174-175).
Buddhist philosophers can accept the existence of cause and so they do not have
any trouble talking about ‘one and the same cause’ of various individuals. They
do, of course, reject the existence of such a cause; nevertheless, they can under-
stand what the Sa¯m. khya thesis states when it is paraphrased in this way. Once
they establish the possibility of engaging with the Sa¯m. khya thesis, the Buddhist
can go on to reject it. In relation to the Sa¯m. khya arguments for the existence
of Primordial Matter, thus, Digna¯ga offers the strategy of paraphrase in order to
avoid the charge of a¯s´raya¯siddha. This is also the strategy that Dharmakı¯rti em-
ploys in his discussion of the proponent’s own intended subject (svadharmin) in
his Prama¯n. ava¯rttika IV.
9Nya¯yamukha, the translation is from Tillemans (1999): 175.
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In relation to the Buddhist argument for the non-existence of Primordial Mat-
ter, Digna¯ga offers a different solution, however:
When they [i.e., the Buddhists] argue that [Primordial Matter] does
not exist [because of nonperception], ‘nonperception’ is a property of
the imagined object.10
The Buddhist metaphysical framework that is assumed here is that only particu-
lars exist.11 Even though inference is a valid means of acquiring knowledge, it can
give us only conceptual knowledge as it operates on the general characterisations
of objects. Having conceptual knowledge is, however, not a proof of existence as
only particulars exist according to the metaphysical view that Digna¯ga assumes
and conceptual knowledge relies on universals. The proof of the existence of ob-
jects ultimately rests on perception which is the means by which one can acquire
knowledge about particulars. So if Primordial Matter can be said to exist, we
have to be able to perceive it. However, we cannot perceive Primordial Matter,
so Digna¯ga claims. Hence, so the argument goes, Primordial Matter does not ex-
ist. This argument is valid assuming that modus tollens is valid. But, in order
for it to be effective, Digna¯ga has to be able to talk about Primordial Matter. He
does this by identifying it as an imagined object meaning that Primordial Mat-
ter is a conceptual object. As inference operates on the conceptual objects that
are characterised by general features, Primordial Matter can then be talked about
meaningfully and, thus, it can be the subject of a proof showing that it does not
exist.
While Digna¯ga does offer the introduction of conceptual objects as a solution
to the charge of a¯s´raya¯siddha in relation to the positive proof that Primordial Mat-
ter is non-existent, he seems to abandon it as a way to avoid the charge. Digna¯ga
might have raised it as a possible solution, but he did not seem to have thought
that invoking conceptual objects is a good way to prove anything and he avoided
proving anything via conceptual objects in his later writings (Katsura (1992)).
Dharmakı¯rti (7th CE), the main philosopher who developed on the work of
Digna¯ga on epistemology and logic, also tended to use the strategy of paraphrase
rather than conceptual object in his discussion on the topic about non-existent
things. In his Prama¯n. ava¯rttika IV, k. 144-45, Dharmakı¯rti considers the anti-
Sa¯m. khya argument that ‘pleasure, pain and bewilderment’ are not the permanent
nature of the ‘transformations’ (vikr. ti) taking place in the world. Sa¯m. khya school
10Nya¯yamukha, the translation is from Tillemans (1999): 175.
11I should note that not all Buddhist philosophers accept this metaphysical view. Ma¯dhyamikas,
for instance, reject the existence of not only universals but also particulars when the existence
is understood as real, as opposed to quasi, existence. The metaphysical view that Digna¯ga is
operating with, however, accepts the existence of particulars.
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takes them to be the (essential) qualities (gun. as) of Primordial Matter. But, be-
cause Dharmakı¯rti rejects the existence of Primordial Matter, he cannot be talking
about pleasure, pain and bewilderment that are the qualities of what he takes to
be non-existent, so the Sa¯m. khya retorts. In response, Dharmakı¯rti paraphrases
them and claims that the subject matter of his anti-Sa¯m. khya argument are not
the qualities of Primordial Matter but the pleasure, pain and bewilderment that
ordinary folks feel. Because everyone, Buddhist or otherwise, accepts these or-
dinary feelings are real entities (vastubhu¯ta) (they are in our experiences), Dhar-
makı¯rti goes on to refute the Sa¯m. khya thesis that pleasure, pain and bewilderment
are permanent (Tillemans (1999): 178-179). In Prama¯n. ava¯rttika IV, k. 141-142,
Dharmakı¯rti offers a parallel discussion about space (Tillemans (1999): 179-180).
The solution to the fallacy of a¯s´raya¯siddha for early Buddhist epistemolo-
gists/logicians such as Digna¯ga and Dharmakı¯rti was, thus, the method of para-
phrase. Buddhist philosophers who came after Digna¯ga and Dharmakı¯rti, how-
ever, largely took the introduction of conceptual objects as the main route to avoid
a¯s´raya¯siddha. Before considering how the method of conceptual objects became
the main solution to the fallacy of a¯s´raya¯siddha, I will say a few words about the
two approaches. That will help us see the distinction between them as well as
what is at stake for Buddhist philosophers in choosing which solution to adopt.
4 Paraphrase vs. Conceptual Objects
The method of paraphrase Digna¯ga and Dharmakı¯rti appeal to in responding to
the Sa¯m. khya charge of a¯s´raya¯siddha might not be thought to be effective. Dhar-
makı¯rti claims that he can legitimately entertain the thesis that pleasure, pain and
bewilderment are permanent in order to refute it by paraphrasing ‘pleasure, pain
and bewilderment’ and rendering it as ‘pleasure, pain and bewilderment of ordi-
nary folks’. Of course, if that’s the strategy, the Sa¯m. khya philosopher can respond
by saying that Dharmakı¯rti simply changed the subject and has not refuted the
Sa¯m. khya thesis. The thesis that Dharmakı¯rti rejects is that the pleasure, pain and
bewilderment that ordinary folks experience are permanent. But the thesis that
the Sa¯m. khya is putting forward is that the pleasure, pain and bewilderment which
are the qualities of Primordial Matter are permanent. Paraphrasing alone does not
allow Dharmakı¯rti to refute the Sa¯m. khya thesis.
The situation is analogous to the following Cookie Monster scenario. Suppose
that your child says that there is Cookie Monster in the closet. You might try to
convince her that that is not the case by saying that Cookie Monster is in the room
by holding a soft toy version of Cookie Monster. She then says: ‘No, daddy, that’s
a toy Cookie Monster and the real Cookie Monster is in the closet!’ Sure enough,
the fact that a toy Cookie Monster is not in the closet does not prove that the real
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Cookie Monster is not in the closet. ‘Silly daddy!’
An analogy like this might be thought to show that the method of paraphrase
is not really a solution to the fallacy of a¯s´raya¯siddha. But what would you say in
response to the child who essentially accuses you of changing the subject? I think
the answer should be: nothing. You know that there is no such thing as the real
Cookie Monster. It is a character enacted by a puppet on a TV show. Even if you
got hold of the puppet actually used on the show and held it in your hand saying:
‘Look! Cookie Monster is here and not in the closet!’, you would, most likely,
still get the same response. So there is not much point in arguing at that point.
This may just be a silly story about Cookie Monster. I am sure that every
parent simply shrugs off by this point. But, for a global error theorist like a typical
Buddhist philosopher, a situation like this is ubiquitous. For a global error theorist,
nothing can be said to really exist. They can talk about ‘replicas’ like a toy Cookie
Monster. But there is nothing other than those ‘replicas’ that they can claim to
exist. So when someone claims that something really exists, all a global error
theorist can do is to put their hands up and surrender. To be a consistent global
error theorist is to be a quietist.12
The device that Buddhist philosophers use to theorise about this aspect of
global error theory is the two truths (or two realities) theory: ultimate truth/reality
(parama¯rthasatya) and conventional truth/reality (sam˙vr. tisatya)).13 What exactly
they are is a matter of debate both for traditional Buddhist philosophers and con-
temporary scholars of Buddhist philosophy.14 Depending on which Buddhist
philosopher or Buddhist scholar we have in mind, what counts as ultimately true
and what can be said to ultimately exist differ. One thing is clear, however. For
Buddhist philosophers, the number of things that can be said to ultimately exist
and have ultimate truth about is very limited if any. Some Madhyamaka philoso-
phers such as Candrakı¯rti (570-650 CE) seem to think that the realm of ultimately
existing entities is empty. In contrast, this realm is rather vast and a very impor-
tant one for non-Buddhist philosophers. Primordial Matter of the Sa¯m. khya, for
instance, is part of the realm of ultimately existing entities. Buddhist philosophers
disagree amongst themselves how small this realm should be but they all agree
that it is a lot smaller than what non-Buddhist philosophers hold it to be. In nuce,
Buddhist philosophers advocate a very sparse ontology and truth in the context
of ultimate truth/reality. If someone insists that something ultimately exists and
there are ultimate truths about them, all Buddhist philosophers can do is ... (being
silent), since, for them, there is nothing that can be said about it.
The above discussion may show that the Buddhist philosophers who advocate
12See a quietist treatment of Madhyamaka in Tillemans (2016).
13‘Satya’ can be rendered as ‘truth’ or ‘reality’ depending on the context.
14For an introduction to the two truths, see, for instance, the Cowherds (2011).
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the method of paragraph as a solution to a¯s´raya¯siddha can be quietists and be
consistent with their other commitments. However, it is not clear that it fares
well as a way to avoid the fallacy of a¯s´raya¯siddha. This is because there is no
guarantee that the opponent’s thesis can always be paraphrased. If someone makes
up an entity and claims that it really exists, there may not be anything in their
conventional reality that they can appeal to in order to paraphrase it. Paraphrasing
is, thus, not a guaranteed method of avoiding the fallacy of a¯s´raya¯siddha.15
The method of introducing conceptual objects, on the other hand, can guaran-
tee that there is an entity that the Buddhist can talk about and, thus, that the fallacy
of a¯s´raya¯siddha can be avoided. For whatever the subject matter the proponent’s
thesis is about, one can posit a conceptual object that corresponds to it.
So, if the issue is only about a¯s´raya¯siddha, the method of positing conceptual
objects may be a better way to deal with the issue. However, it essentially re-
introduces the entities that the Buddhist wants to avoid. Subscribing this method
is, thus, like Occam (or Ockham) multiplying the number of entities in order to
demonstrate the law of parsimony: do not multiply entities beyond necessity. In
order to show that the Buddhist can entertain the proponent’s thesis and that they
are, thus, entitled to reject it, they are reintroducing more entities albeit of a dif-
ferent kind. How did this come about? As we will see in the next section, it was
Dharmakı¯rti who planted the seeds for this development.
5 Avoiding the Fallacy of A¯s´raya¯siddha Part II
As we saw above, in the context of talking about the proponent’s own subject
matter (svadharmin), Dharmakı¯rti appeals to the method of paraphrase.16 How-
ever, he provided two strands of thought that, when they are put together, might
be taken to imply the method of conceptual object as the solution to the fallacy
of a¯s´raya¯siddha. This seems to be what some Buddhist philosophers who came
after Dharmakı¯rti did. In this section, I will present how the method of conceptual
object became the main solution to a¯s´raya¯siddha after Dharmakı¯rti. I will then
present the problems with the method as identified in the tradition.
(1) In commenting on Digna¯ga’s discussion of svadharmin (the proponent’s
intended subject), Dharmakı¯rti distinguishes two kinds of a thesis’ subject: the
15Digna¯ga and Dharmakı¯rti seem to assume that they can always paraphrase their opponents’
theses. To be fair, they and other Buddhist philosophers have developed enough conventional
resources to paraphrase all kinds of theses about the things that are crucial to Buddhist philoso-
phers and non-Buddhist philosophers. I do not see, however, that there is a way of showing that
paraphrasing as a general method is always available.
16See also Prajña¯karagupta’s (750-810 CE) commentary on Dharmakı¯rti’s Prama¯n. ava¯rttika IV
k. 141-42 in his Prama¯n. ava¯rttikabha¯s. ya. A translation of the relevant passage can be found in
Tillemans (1999): 177-78.
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subject actually intended by the proponent (svadharmin) and the subject which is
‘unrelated, isolated’ (kevala) (Prama¯n. ava¯rttika IV k. 136-48). The subject which
is ‘unrelated, isolated’ is a ‘nominal’ subject (using the gloss Tibetans often give
to kevala) in the sense that it is a subject that can be talked about even though it is
not the actual subject (Tillemans (1999): 172-173).
(2) Dharmakı¯rti came up with the principle that a word in the subject place
of a sentence always signifies a conceptual representation (kalpana¯) (e.g., PV I
k. 205-212). He then applied this principle to the case of Primordial Matter and
claimed that while Primordial Matter did not exist, the object of the word did exist
as a conceptual object (Tillemans (1999): 175-176).
Buddhist philosophers who came after Dharmakı¯rti combined these two strands
of thought in the following way. First, in the context of (1), two of the prominent
commentators of Dharmakı¯rti’s Prama¯n. ava¯rttika, Devendrabuddhi (630-690 CE)
and S´a¯kyabuddhi (660-720), explain that the subject of a thesis which the propo-
nent takes as existent but the Buddhist takes as non-existent is a nominal subject
(or kevala (unrelated or isolated)). In this way, they help themselves to talk about
the subject even though it is non-existent.
S´a¯kyabuddhi and Devendrabuddhi recognise that they cannot simply stipu-
late such a subject to be nominal. The problem for them (and for most Buddhist
philosophers) is that they are global error theorists. Being global error theorists
means that they do not think that properties can be attributed to anything, whether
existent or non-existent, as they are not factual matters as discussed before. How
can they show that it is false that Primordial Matter exists, for instance?
They do this by characterising properties (and reasons given for a thesis) to be
mere exclusions (vyavacchedama¯tra). S´a¯kyabuddhi (though not Devendrabuddhi)
explains mere exclusions to be non-implicative negations (prasajyapratis. edha).
A negation is non-implicative if it does not entail anything positive. For instance,
the negation involved in the statement ‘There are not any flowers that grow in the
sky’ is non-implicative as it does not imply anything that grows in the sky. These
negations are invoked commonly in Buddhist philosophy as a way of legitimis-
ing the lack of any positive commitment. In contrast, a negation is implicative
if it does entail something positive. For instance, the negation involved in ‘The
rose is not red’ is implicative as it implies that the rose has some other colour.17
So mere exclusions mean that there is nothing that is implied, stated or presup-
posed (S´a¯kyabuddhi’s Prama¯n. ava¯rttikat. ı¯ka¯ D.269a4-5.) Dharmakı¯rti’s commen-
tators, in particular S´a¯kyabuddhi, can then claim that the proponent’s thesis can
be denied without implying anything positive. And, because nothing positive is
asserted by denying or negating the opponent’s thesis, they do not face the fallacy
17For the contrast between non-implicative negations (prasajyapratis. edha) and implicative
negations (paryuda¯sapratis. edha), see Kajiyama (1973).
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of a¯s´raya¯siddha (Tillemans (1999): 173).
Second, the later Buddhist philosophers have often wheeled in Dharmakı¯rti’s
principle (2) about conceptual objects as the signifiers of words generously and
applied it to an understanding of the proponent’s own intended subject matter
(svadharmin). In particular, they took the introduction of conceptual objects as
the main route to avoid a¯s´raya¯siddha. Prajña¯karagupta (750-810 CE) and Ka-
malas´ı¯la (740-795 CE) as well as Tsong kha pa (1357-1419 CE), S´a¯kya mchog
ldan (1428-1507 CE)) and other Tibetans further developed on the invocation of
non-implicative negations (prasajyapratis. edha) and claimed that the proponent’s
intended subject (identified as kevaladharmin) is what the proponent takes to be
real and Buddhist’s intended subject (svadharmin) is not just a nominal subject
but the conceptual object representing that non-existent entity. Since the subject
is a conceptual object which may not have any corresponding existent entity, the
Buddhist can then say that the proponent’s intended subject is non-existent. And
because the negation involved in the rejection of the proponent’s thesis is non-
implicative, no existence of any entity or property is committed. By identifying
the subject matter as conceptual object, the danger of the fallacy of a¯s´raya¯siddha
can be avoided (Tillemans (1999): 173-174). This is how the method of concep-
tual object became the main solution to a¯s´raya¯siddha after Dharmakı¯rti.
6 Difficulties of Positing Conceptual Objects
Is the method of conceptual objects a better solution than the method of para-
phrase? By positing conceptual objects in place of the proponent’s subject, the
Buddhist can ‘guarantee’ (though it is basically a guarantee by stipulation) that
the fallacy of a¯s´raya¯siddha can always be avoided. The method of paraphrase
favoured by Digna¯ga and Dharmakı¯rti lacks such guarantee as there is no guaran-
tee that paraphrase is always available. However, introducing conceptual entities
and inflating one’s ontology straight after deflating it cannot be free of any diffi-
culties. We can see some of the difficulties and complicated attempted solutions
in the writing of the Mongolian scholar writing in Tibetan, A lag sha ngag dbang
bstan dar (or Ngag dbang bstan dar) (1759-1840 CE), in particular in his bCig du
bral gyi rnam bzhag.18
Ngag dbang bstan dar shows that the use of two types of negations, implica-
tive and non-implicative negations, does not clearly distinguish between the cases
of subject failure which are harmless because they are in the context of the non-
implicative negations and genuinely fallacious a¯s´raya¯siddha which is problem-
18The section on a¯s´raya¯siddha of this text has been translated in Tillemans and Lopez (1998).
The discussion below will follow their translation and their extensive explanatory notes.
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atic.19 First, he shows that the negation involved in a thesis does not have to be
non-implicative in order to avoid a¯s´raya¯siddha. He uses the following example
to show this: ‘Take as the subject, a rabbit’s horn; it is fitting to be designated by
the word ‘moon,’ because it exists as an object of conceptual thought’ (Tillemans
& Lopez (1998): 102).20 The property of being fit to be designated by the word
‘moon’ is a positive ‘entity’. So, the property attributed to the subject, a rabbit’s
horn, is a positive ‘entity’ even though the subject is non-existent. Thus, the prop-
erty that predicates a non-existent subject does not have to be a mere exclusion
(vyavacchedama¯tra); it can be a positive ‘entity’ or an implicative negation. Sec-
ond, he shows that the property attributed to the subject and the reason given for
the attribution being non-implicative negations does not show that the fallacy of
a¯s´raya¯siddha is avoided. For instance, consider proving ‘that [something nonex-
istent like a rabbit’s horn] is the subtle selflessness of the elements by means
of the reason, ‘being the consummate [nature]’. The subject, a rabbit’s horn, is
non-existent even though the reason (i.e., being the consummate nature) and the
property to be proved (i.e., being the subtle selflessness of the elements) are non-
implicative negations. Using examples like this, Ngag dbang bstan dar concludes
that the fallacy of a¯s´raya¯siddha is avoided not when the reason and the property to
be proved are non-implicative negations but when the reason and the property do
not imply existence (Tillemans & Lopez (1998): 102). That is, subject failure is
problematic not necessarily when the subject is non-existent but when the proper-
ties attributed to the subject imply existence. When those properties do not imply
existence, subject failure is not a problem (Tillemans & Lopez (1998) footnote
11).
Finally, Ngag dbang bstan dar points out that the conceptual object approach
to a¯s´raya¯siddha is no better than the paraphrasing approach when it comes to the
issue of changing the subject. As we saw before, the adversary can legitimately
complain that the Buddhist is changing the subject when the Buddhist paraphrases
their thesis. Ngag dbang bstan dar points out that the same problem arises with
the method of introducing conceptual objects. For instance, for the non-Buddhist
Vais´es.ika, sound is permanent. The Buddhist rejects this and wants to argue that
sound is impermanent. The thesis the Buddhist wants to assert has a subject that is
non-existent. The Buddhist method of conceptual objects stipulates that sound is a
conceptual object;21 it is not sound itself but ‘what appears as sound to conceptual
19For the development of the Buddhist discussions about a¯s´raya¯siddha, see also Klein (1991),
Kobayashi (1989) and Lopez (1987).
20Ngag dbang bstan dar attributes this example to ’Jam dbhyangs bzhad pa’i rdo rje (1648-
1721/1722 CE). However, the example cannot be found in the works of ’Jam dbhyangs bzhad pa’i
rdo rje. See Tillemans & Lopez (1998) footnote 9.
21There is a complicated story as to what exactly it means to say that sound is a conceptual
object in terms of apoha (exclusion). Since the introduction of apoha does not add anything
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thought...a real entity (dngos po) that is independent (rang dbang ba) and is a
positive phenomenon (sgrub pa)’ (Tillemans & Lopez (1998): 104). Ngag dbang
bstan dar implies that the Buddhist and the Vais´es.ika are talking past each other.
So the method of conceptual object faces the same difficulty as the method of
paraphrasing.
This difficulty is something that Ngag dbang bstan dar himself responds. He
claims that ‘a mere object grasped by the auditive consciousness’ concordantly ap-
pears to both parties upon hearing the word ‘sound’ (Tillemans & Lopez (1998):
105). When the Buddhist and the Vais´es.ika argue about sound (or space which
attracts a parallel argumentation) or when the Buddhist and the Sa¯m. khya argue
about Primordial Matter, they are arguing about a mere verbal designation or a
verbal object (sgra don). The Vais´es.ika takes sound as more than just a verbal
object: it is permanent and fully real and the Sa¯m. khya takes Primordial Matter
as more than just a verbal object, i.e., fully real. Nevertheless, there are ‘concor-
dantly appearing subjects’ (chos can mthun snang ba) for both parties.22
What is crucial here is the distinction between ‘the exclusion qua thing itself
(rang ldog) and the exclusion qua basis [for the thing] (gzhi ldog)’ (Tillemans &
Lopez (1998): 106). The distinction is between the thing itself and an instance
of it under a description. Ngag dbang bstan dar uses this distinction to argue that
the Buddhist and their opponent are both arguing about a verbal object, an object
under some description, even though neither party recognises it as such (Tillemans
& Lopez (1998) footnote 30). He then concludes that there is no problem in
changing the subject. Both parties are talking about the same thing. It is just that
the opponent wrongly thinks that the object in question is something more than
this and thinks that it is fully real.
Is this a plausible solution? In order to deal with a problem that arose by the
introduction of conceptual objects, Ngag dbang bstan dar appeals to yet another
conceptual apparatus: concordantly appearing subjects. Perhaps, constantly intro-
ducing new conceptual apparatus and continuously keeping the conceptual realm
fine-grained, the Buddhist can come to prove that non-existent things do not ex-
ist. But how rich our conceptual life would have to be to prove that the self, a
non-existent entity, does not exist? I will leave this question unanswered.
substantive in the present context, I refrain from spelling it all out. For discussions on apoha, see
Siderits, Tillemans & Chakrabarti (2011).
22The notion of ‘concordantly appearing subject’ seems to be a Tibetan development, though
there is an Indian precedence of problematising the lack of commonly acknowledged (ub-
hayaprasiddha) subjects in debates. For the development of ‘concordantly appearing subject’,
see Lopez (1987), Hopkins (1989) and Tillemans (1990).
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7 Conclusion
How can Buddhists prove that non-existent things do not exist? With great dif-
ficulty. For the Buddhist, this is not a laughing matter as they are largely global
error theorists and, thus, many things are non-existent. The difficulty gets com-
pounded as the Buddhist and their opponent, the non-Buddhist of various kinds,
both agree that one cannot prove a thesis whose subject is non-existent. Bud-
dhist philosophers have developed mainly two strategies to avoid this difficulty:
the method of paraphrase and the method of conceptual objects. Early Buddhist
philosophers proposed the method of paraphrase as the solution to the difficulty of
talking about non-existent things. This proposal, however, was not taken up by the
later Buddhist philosophers. What became the main approach to argue about non-
existent things is the method of conceptual objects. But this strategy imports all
of the problems associated with a separate issue into what is already a minefield.
Rather than addressing the question of how to argue about non-existence, the later
Buddhist philosophers have, in addition, taken themselves to be tasked with ex-
plaining why it is not puzzling to bring non-existence into existence of some sort.
As we saw, that multiplied the problems requiring them to come up with ingenious
attempts to solve the difficulties. What the history of Buddhist philosophy would
look like if the method of paraphrase was further developed and adopted widely?
We would never know. That history is non-existent and that is where we have to
be silent.
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